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Introduction
Currency substitution has always been an important feature of the Russian economy. The hyperinflation that occurred in the early 1990s and the major depreciation events (most importantly, the currency crisis of 1998) increased the demand for reserve currency for holding savings. In subsequent years, however, ruble appreciation has led to extensive dedollarization, only to be followed by a shift into foreign currency assets in late 2008.
Alongside these developments, we have seen certain other aspects of financial dollarization. In a situation of rapid economic growth, an under-developed banking system, and tightly managed exchange rates; excessive reliance on foreign money markets has resulted in the creation of an abundance of foreign currency-linked liabilities.
Analysis of dollarization processes is an important element of the central bank"s research agenda because overall economic performance as well as the implementation of monetary policy may be substantially impacted by changes in agents" currency preferences. Dollarization of the economy has a strong influence on the stability of a banking system that faces liquidity and solvency risks as external debt is being accumulated by different sectors of the economy while there is a demand for the domestic currency. The analysis of dollarization is also crucial for the conduct of monetary policy since dollarization hinders the central bank"s efforts to act as lender of last resort and complicates its liquidity management and thus impedes the achievement of the ultimate goals of monetary policy, particularly during sudden stop episodes. Dollarized economies are highly exposed to the risks of currency and financial crises that threaten financial stability and disturb the macroeconomic balance. Consequently, the problem of financial dollarization is closely related to the issues of exchange rate policy and financial stability.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the drivers of these processes and review the possible consequences. The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 provides a general description of the dynamics of certain dollarization indicators for Russia. In Section 2 some econometric models of the short run dynamics of deposit and loan dollarization are presented. In Section 3 we conduct a balance-sheet analysis and estimate currency mismatches for different sectors of the Russian economy. In Section 4 we examine how dollarization might have affected Russian economic performance in view of the recent financial crisis, and Section 5 concludes.
causes and consequences 8 1 The evolution of financial dollarization in Russia Dollarization 1 is peculiar to many emerging markets and to a number of transition economies where foreign currency substitutes for the domestic currency as a store of value, unit of account and means of payment. In the 1990s, a many restrictions on transactions on foreign exchange market were lifted in Russia. At the same time, the country had been going through a prolonged period of macroeconomic instability against a backdrop of sharp devaluations of the domestic currency and galloping inflation, which dampened activity in all sectors of the economy. In conditions of a dramatic drop in ruble purchasing power, the role of foreign currency (mainly the USD) had grown considerably and had since remained strong. The last decade was marked by unstable dynamics of the dollarization of the Russian economy, including periods of both accelerated growth and easing demand for foreign currency. We will review the different aspects of financial dollarization in more detail in this section.
Deposit dollarization.
We use the ratios of foreign currency deposits to total deposits in the banking system and to broad money as indicators of the degree of dollarization 2 . It should be noted that after the introduction of euro, economic agents began to hold their foreign currency assets (cash and non-cash) in two currencies. At the same time, despite the prevalence of the US dollar, the share of euro denominated assets was gradually rising. Thereby the overall level of deposit dollarization (as well as the dynamics of foreign currency in circulation) was affected not only by the ruble-to-dollar exchange rate but also by ruble-to-euro rate.
As seen in Figure 1 , the level of deposit dollarization in Russia was unstable (the share of foreign currency deposits in total deposits ranged from 43 to 12.8%). Note that there were two dramatic spikes in the level of deposit dollarization, both associated with crisis episodes, in 1998 and 2008-2009. 1 Traditionally the term "dollarization" implies replacement of domestic currency by US dollars as the medium of exchange, store of value and unit of account. After formation of European Monetary System and introduction of the single currency (euro), the new term "euroization" (completely analogous to dollarization) came into use. Euroization was quite typical for a number of transition economies, including Russia. We use the term "dollarization" to denote the replacement of the national currency by any foreign currency. 1-Jan-97 1-Jan-98 1-Jan-99 1-Jan-00 1-Jan-01 1-Jan-02 1-Jan-03 1-Jan-04 1-Jan-05 1-Jan-06 1-Jan-07 1-Jan-08 1-Jan-09 1-Jan-10 1-Jan-11
Share of foreign currency deposits in broad money, % As opposed to these two sectors, the level of deposit dollarization for financial organizations was considerably lower (except from mid-2002 to mid-2003) but much more volatile. Over the last three years, the shares of households" and non-financial organizations" foreign currency deposits were approximately the same (45-50% on average) while the share of financial organizations was insignificant (1-2.5% on average). Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97 Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 We can also proxy the exchange rate expectations by the realized annual ruble weighted appreciation rate against USD and euro. By summing these two we obtain a proxy for the implied deposit yield (borrowing cost) differential. Figure 5 demonstrates that the latter component mainly determined the variation of these indicators, suggesting that exchange rate fluctuations were more important for dollarization dynamics than interest rate differentials. 
Share of foreign currency deposits in total deposits

Foreign assets Foreign liabilities Net foreign assets
The dollarization of foreign debt is another important aspect of financial dollarization.
The reasons for the country being unable to borrow abroad in its own currency include the 
Econometric analysis of financial dollarization
We conduct formal econometric analysis of domestic ∆ DD t =α 1 *(1-dum2008)*erf t + α 2 *dum2008*erf t + α 3 *dum2005*er_comb t + α 4 *mbf t + α 5 *∆ ratio t + + α 6 *∆ LD t + α 7 *ird t + α 8 *∆ DD t-1 +α 9 *∆ DD t-2 + α 10 +ε t (1)
We use changes in deposit dollarization (∆ DD) and in loan dollarization (∆ LD) as dependent variables. 5 The formal econometric analysis of foreign debt dollarization is hampered by the shortness of time series available only at quarterly frequency. ) and estimated the coefficient for the er_comb variable separately for the period beginning in 2005 (the coefficient for the former part of the sample was estimated but was insignificant and hence removed from the final specification).
Another category of explanatory variables is supposed to capture banks" currency matching behavior. As in Basso et al. (2011) we use the increase in the ratio of banks" foreign liabilities to total liabilities, net of deposits (∆ ratio), as an indicator of changes in banks" balance sheet structure. We also include changes in loan dollarization and deposit dollarization as explanatory variables in loan and deposit dollarization equations accordingly.
Other variables in the model are the monetary base factor 8 (mbf), the differential between ruble interest rate and the weighted average of euro and USD interest rates on deposits and loans (ird), two lagged dependent variables that prevented autocorrelation of residuals, and a constant (the variables are shown on Figure 8 and summary statistics are reported in Table 1 ). Table 1 Variables used in equations (1) We used monthly data over the period January 2001 to June 2011. The use of earlier observations is impeded by data availability. The dynamics of the financial variables in the period following the 1998 crisis are also excessively volatile and their inclusion would render some of the time series non-stationary (in our sample, stationarity is confirmed by the KPSS unit-root test reported in Table 2 ). We consider the sample to be quite representative, as it includes the periods of both gradual de-dollarization and the partial return of dollarization in 2008. 7 This period was chosen arbitrarily and coincides with the inclusion of the euro in the exchange rate target of the CBR. The results remain robust for the alternative periods starting in 2004 and 2006. 8 Similarly to the exchange rate factor variable changes in monetary base were transformed so as to be proportional to the mechanical effect coming from presumed changes the nominal value of national currency deposits. That is, for deposit dollarization mbf t = (1-DD t-1 )*DD t-1 *(m t /m t-1 -1), where m is the broad monetary base. The mbf variable in the loan dollarization equation was similarly constructed.
Alexey
We report estimates of the benchmark model, including all explanatory variables as well as the specification that includes only statistically significant (t-statistic>1.5) estimates. In order to check for robustness of estimates and to take account of the possibility of explanatory factors being endogenous relative to dollarization, we calculated both OLS and GMM
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estimates. In the latter case we used 3 lags of the dependent and explanatory variables, changes in oil price and USD/ruble exchange rate appreciation as instrumental variables. Deposit dollarization increases (more than the mechanical effect would imply since the coefficient is larger than unity) in response to ruble depreciation against the bi-currency bas- The monetary base expansion restrains deposit dollarization, although the passthrough is less than one-to-one.
There is a negative relationship between deposit dollarization and banks" foreign liabilities growth, which can be seen as evidence of currency matching by banks. The change in loan dollarization also has the "correct" sign but is statistically insignificant, as is the interest rate differential. Estimates of the loan dollarization equation provide evidence that the time-varying exchange rate effect is larger than the pure mechanical re-evaluation effect on the pre-crisis sample (meaning that it was borrowers rather than the banks that were willing to accept the exchange rate risk) and significantly lower after the crisis. That is consistent with our supposition regarding changes in borrowers" behavior following the increase in exchange rate volatility. Whereas during the earlier part of the sample borrowers seemed to perceive ex- Finally we find a some evidence of currency matching behavior -this time the statistically significant variable is deposit dollarization rather than the foreign liabilities ratio.
Like the deposit dollarization equation, the interest rate differential here is not statistically significant.
Overall, we conclude that our estimates of deposit and loan dollarization drivers foreign currency and ruble deposits was also mainly determined by exchange rate fluctuations. Evidence of banks" currency matching behavior also seems to be present, but it is not highly pronounced.
Balance-sheet analysis and currency mismatches
To assess the implications of financial dollarization for financial fragility we employ balance-sheet analysis. The methodology of balance-sheet analysis was devised by Allen and others (2002). The aim is to measure vulnerabilities due to mismatches in the structure of assets and liabilities at the sectoral level and assess the resulting macroeconomic risks.
Balance-sheet analysis can be considered an important complement to more traditional methods of assessing financial stability based on analysis of flow variables, such as fiscal and current account balances. It is also widely used for financial crisis prediction.
We apply balance-sheet analysis in order to estimate currency mismatches among sectors of Russian economy over a period 2000 to 2010. Our goal is to determine what sectors were highly exposed to exchange rate risks during the global financial crisis of 2008.
We consider four sectors: government, Central Bank, banking sector and private nonbanking sector. The latter consists of households, non-financial commercial organizations and nonbanking financial organizations. We cannot examine them separately due to a lack of data. The main data source is the statistics of the Bank of Russia, notably the Credit Institutions Survey, Banking System Survey, Review of the Banking Sector of the Russian Federation and External Sector Statistics. Some data gaps remain but these are believed to be negligible.
For each sector we select the foreign currency accounts that can be regarded as claims or liabilities of the particular sector to other sectors, including the external sector (see Tables 5-8 ). As a basis for construction of these accounts we use the foreign currency balance sheet of a partially dollarized economy, as presented in Reinhart and others (2003) .
In order to take into account the specificity of Russian economy we exclude some accounts that we consider negligible or irrelevant and add some accounts that are found only in Russian practice. We exclude foreign currency-linked government debt to the private nonbanking sector because we assume that this sector does not hold foreign currency denominated sovereign bonds or if it does the position is negligible. We also assume that all of the private nonbanking sector"s foreign currency bonds are owned by non-residents. Therefore, they are already included in external foreign currency liabilities of this sector. In Russia the banking sector does not generally issue credit to government. Thus we exclude foreign currency net bank credit to government from the balance sheets of the government and banking sector.
By assuming that all foreign assets of government are held in the Bank of Russia as international reserves we are able to exclude this account from the government balance sheet.
Finally, we exclude required reserves on foreign currency bank deposits from the balance sheet of the Bank of Russia because all reserves, irrespective of the currency in which deposits are denominated, are held at the Bank of Russia in rubles.
In December 2008 commercial banks were allowed to place foreign currency on deposit at the Bank of Russia. Therefore we include foreign currency deposits held at Cen-tral Bank in balance sheets of banking sector and the Bank of Russia as assets and liabilities respectively.
After we have built the foreign currency balance sheets we estimate net foreign currency positions defined as foreign currency assets minus foreign currency liabilities. All foreign currency assets and liabilities are denominated in rubles, while net foreign currency position is calculated in percentage of GDP. Net foreign currency position can be considered as an indicator of a sector"s vulnerability to movements in the exchange rate. In particular, if the net foreign currency position is negative, this means that this sector is vulnerable to exchange rate depreciation. Using net foreign currency positions for each sector we estimate net foreign currency position for private and public sectors and finally for the Russian economy as a whole. The CBR"s net foreign currency position ( Figure 11 ) has almost quadrupled during the period studied. The persistent growth of net foreign assets up to year 2007 was driven by several factors. An increase in the Bank of Russia"s international reserves reflects large purchases of foreign currency in response to strong capital inflows and upward pressure on the ruble. Conversion of foreign currency holdings into rubles by individuals and companies, reflecting a decline in deposit dollarization, also contributed to the build-up of reserves. Enduring budget surpluses, stemming largely from substantial tax revenues from oil exports, led to a large accumulation of the Stabilization Fund, which was invested mainly in foreign currency denominated assets. Since the Stabilization Fund appears on the CBR balance sheet, we consider it a part of the CBR"s foreign currency assets, despite the fact that it is government owned. A slight decline in the net foreign currency position over the next three years can be regarded as a result of two opposing effects. CBR actions to stabilize the foreign exchange market in the face of huge capital outflows have had a negative effect on its net foreign assets, while a sharp devaluation of the ruble has had a positive effect. Thus the whole sector is subject to significant exchange rate risk in connection with ruble appreciation. for lending to unhedged borrowers. We follow their approach in making some adjustments in the banking and private nonbanking sectors. We are able to obtain only approximate estimates because of the lack of data on the composition of assets and liabilities in both these sectors and on the extent to which private nonbanking sector borrowers of foreign currency are hedged.
We assume that firms in the oil and gas industry are hedged against exchange rate risk due to the fact that most of their revenues are denominated in foreign currency. Therefore, their foreign currency liabilities are not subject to exchange rate risk and should be subtracted from the liabilities of the private nonbanking sector. We calculate the fraction of foreign currency bank loans to the oil and gas industry in total loans to non-financial organizations and as in Ranciere et al. (2010) extrapolate to the household sector. We do this under the simplifying assumption that the same fraction of bank loans to households corresponds to loans made by households receiving income from oil and gas industry. Then we subtract these "hedged" bank loans from the liabilities of the private nonbanking sector and reduce banking sector assets by an amount equal to "unhedged" bank loans. As for the external liabilities of private nonbanking sector, we also try to subdivide them into "hedged"
and "unhedged". Using the data on external foreign currency debt securities, we are able to estimate the volume of foreign currency bonds in circulation issued by oil and gas firms and subtract it from the external foreign currency liabilities of the whole sector. Since we do not have data on the sectoral structure of external foreign currency loans, we assume that the fraction of external foreign currency loans going to oil and gas firms is equal to that of syndicated foreign currency loans going to the oil and gas industry. By eliminating these loans from external foreign currency liabilities, we obtain the adjusted foreign currency position. 
Conclusion
Financial dollarization is the prominent feature of the Russian economy. Its level is highly unstable and displays sharp fluctuations in response to changes in the macroeconomic environment. We found that the ruble appreciation rate (against the USD and euro) was the main driving factor for the deposit de-dollarization that occurred and also for the later episode of deposit dollarization. This means that exchange rate fluctuations in Russia are usually amplified by changes in currency preferences. Loan dollarization was also found to depend positively on the ruble depreciation rate, although during the financial crisis the exchange rate effect was estimated to be smaller than the mechanical re-evaluation effect (reflecting the decrease in demand for foreign currency loans). There is also only slight evidence of currency matching behavior by the banks.
Such behavior, together with substantial borrowing from abroad, has led to the large currency mismatches in the real sector"s balance sheet. The banking sector may seem to be less vulnerable to exchange rate risk, but, after taking into account the fact that a large part of banks assets are claims on domestic unhedged borrowers, we conclude that not only the private nonbanking sector but also the banking sector was subject to currency 
